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In this paper I discuss prospects for the world economy and for Latin-American
exports from now until 1990, and present a framework of facts, but my chief
concern is the trade policy alternatives confronting individual Latin-American
countries today. The country level is where the policy choices are meaningful.
Indeed, in the absence of a regionwide economy, analysis of the region as a
whole tends to be a waste of time. However, I cannot get entirely away from
the regional level of abstraction because many of my data are for Latin America
as a whole.
THE RECENT PAST
Growth and Development Performance
Since the 1950s economic performance in most Latin-American countries
has been satisfactory by previous historical standards, but only mediocre com-
pared with what has been achieved by countries at comparable levels of devel-
opment in other parts of the world. By recent standards only the largest country
in the region, Brazil, can be counted among the world's success stories in eco-
nomic growth rates, having increased its GNP per capita at 4.9 percent per
annum in the years 1960-7 7. * The next best performances have been the
Dominican Republic (3.6 percent per annum), Panama (3.5), Costa Rica
(3.2), and Ecuador (3.1), followed by Mexico and Guatemala (2.8 each).
By comparison, per capita growth rates much higher than these were achieved
in several industrializing countries of Southern Europe — Spain (5.2 percent
per annum), Portugal (6.0), Greece (6.2), and Yugoslavia (5.6) —and in
four East Asian economies — Korea (7.4), Taiwan (6.2), Hong Kong (6.5),
and Singapore (7.5) — as well as a few others such as Iran (7.9). IntermediateEXPORTS AND POLICY 19
performers in some other developing regions have also done better than most
countries of Latin America; for example, Thailand (4.5), Tunisia (4.3), Tur-
key (4.1), and Malaysia (3.9). Meanwhile, several of the Latin-American
countries such as Cuba, Haiti, Uruguay, Chile, and Honduras have realized
practically no growth in per capita income in these same years, 1960-77. The
Latin-American countries have also recorded mixed but generally less-than-
outstanding performances in other aspects of development; for example, even
the more successful growth performances in the region have left large groups
of the population behind in poverty.
2 Nevertheless, by most indications, most
Latin-American countries other than Haiti are firmly established in the middle
ranks of the developing countries, since they are not as poor nor as stagnant
and technically backward as most of sub-Saharan Africa, and in most respects
they are also ahead of South Asia.
Export Performance
One reason that Latin-American countries have not done better has been
their poor export performance, leading to sluggish expansion of trade. An ex-
ception to prove the rule was Brazil from 1967 to 1974, when swiftly rising
exports led to an extraordinary growth of GDP. The sluggishness elsewhere
contrasts sharply with the spectacular export increase achieved by East Asian
countries and with the impressive trade expansion in most of Southern and
Western Europe over the last 20 years; in these regions and in the world as a
whole, trade has grown faster than output. By contrast, in Latin America, as
Table 1 shows, exports increased from 1960 to 1976 at only 3.5 percent per
annum, less than half the growth rate of world trade (7.4 percent) and far less
than the region's GDP growth rate (5.9 percent) for the same period.
3
Depressed rates of export growth have undoubtedly retarded development,
so that today most Latin-American countries show symptoms commonly asso-
ciated with insufficient exports, ranging from scaled-baGk growth plans and
recurrent payments difficulties to continuing insufficiency of market size keep-
ing costs high in most industries, disappointing trends in competitiveness, and
high incremental capital-output ratios (ICORs) implying low returns on
investment.
Slow increases in exports have been caused partly by the dictates of the
region's resources, leading to a heavy concentration in primary exports which
are held back as a result of slow growth of world demand as in coffee, and by
a limited ability to increase output in each country because of natural-resource
supply constraints. The region's manufactured exports have been growing fast,
but only from a low base so that they only constituted one-seventh of the re-
gion's merchandise exports in 1977.
4 Table 2 shows some of the leading export
products and their principal suppliers. Even for the countries trying hardest
to export manufactures, the balance between natural and human resources20 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Table 1
GROWTH SATES OF LATIN-AMERICA'S MERCHANDISE EXPORTS COMPARED WITH
THOSE OF THE WORLD AND OF ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1960-76














































Sources: Except for beverages row, first two columns are from
World Bank, World Development Report, 1979, Table 3; Latin-American
manufactured products are computed from trade matrixes in UNCTAD,
Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1979,
deflated by a unit value index for all developing countries from
United Nations (UN), Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, June 1978,
Special Table G. Latin-American merchandise exports are from a
UN quantum index (1970=»100) in UN, Yearbook of International Trade
Statistics, 1977, vol. I, Special Table C; other numbers are from
[10] based on World Bank indexes.
aDefined here, to include Southern Europe, Israel, and South Africa
while excluding capital surplus oil exporters such as Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Libya, and United Arab Emirates.
Not strictly comparable, with other numbers in this row but a com-
parable figure would be about the same as the growth rate for all
developing countries.
poses problems in which abundant natural resources, through their effects on
wages and exchange rates, make it difficult to compete in world markets for
manufactures. Thus in many parts of Latin America in recent years, for
example, in Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, it has proved
difficult to continue to expand manufactured exports amidst booming primary
exports and inflationary pressures. Elsewhere in the world the countries with
fast growing exports, apart from oil countries, have been those specializing in
manufactured exports. This frees the countries to some extent from limitations
of local natural resources and gives them export industries with immense pos-
sibilities for learning and increasing returns.
Besides difficulties caused by the natural resource situation, trade expansion
has also been held back in most Latin-American countries by biases in their
national development policies leading to neglect and discouragement of ex-EXPORTS AND POLICY 21
ports and of potential export sectors such as agriculture and mining. This has
been largely a matter of incentives favoring manufacturing and, within manu-
facturing, production for the domestic market, while turning the terms of
trade against agriculture and creating strong disincentives against exports. Pat-
terns of public expenditure (and subsidy) have also been responsible — agri-
culture and mineral exploration and the opportunities to save resources through
trade have been systematically neglected in favor of costly premature industrial
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Source: UN, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1978, Vol. II.
.Including large exports by Caribbean refiners.
Vegetable oil residues for animal feed.
Costa Rica led with 23 percent followed by Honduras (17%) and Ecuador (16%).22 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Table 3
LATIN-AMERICA'S CHANGING SHARE OF WORLD EXPORTS,


















































Sources: 1955 to 1965: trade matrices of UNCTAD, Handbook of Inter-
national Trade and Development Statistics, 1979; 1970: UN, Yearbook
of International Trade Statistics, 1975, Vol. I, Special Table B; 1974
and 1977: UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, May 1979, Special Table D.
undertakings. Indeed, it is not so clear the "natural" wage differences are un-
favorable to manufactured exports in Latin America, now that wages of un-
skilled workers are higher in Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong than in many
Latin-American countries.
5
Partly as a result of deficiencies in policies, as Table 3 shows, Latin-Amer-
ica's share of world exports decreased from 1955 to 1977 in all major primary
product categories even though the region has a rich natural resource poten-
tial. Looking closely, however, one can see signs of a recent reversal in the
long-term downtrend in the region's share of world agricultural exports, per-
haps because the policy bias against agriculture has been reduced in Brazil,
Argentina, and Chile. At a more detailed product level (see Table 4), while
the region's export performance has been miserable by comparative and abso-
lute standards in most primary commodities, a spectacular growth has been
achieved in soybean products, mainly in Brazil, while a very satisfactory per-
formance has been in coarse grains (including maize) and iron ore. These
products have been exceptions to the rule, benefiting from reasonably favorable
exchange rages and government attention.
Effects of Setbacks in the World Economy
Latin-American countries' export difficulties in the last few years have been
compounded by the recent slow and erratic growth in the world economy, cut-
ting the rate of trade growth to less than what it was previously. Their ever
lagging exports have been hurt as a result, declining absolutely in volume in
the period 1974-77, as shown in Table 5, while GDP growth in the region
fell from about 6.5 percent a year in 1965-74 to about 4 percent a year in
1974-77. This fall must have been caused in large measure by the export
decline and the resulting cutting by half of the import growth.EXPORTS AND POLICY 23
Table 4
HISTORICAL GROWTH PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED NONFUEL






































































Source: [10], based on volume indexes of the World Bank's
Commodities and Exports Projections Division. Developing
countries here exclude Southern Europe.
Though these setbacks have sprung partly from the high degree of linkage
to the world economy, they also reflect the fact that in most of the region
exports are not competitive and their expansion has little built-in momentum,
while imports have had to be pared down to the point where further reductions
have a large negative effect on growth. By comparison, as Table 4 shows, other
developing regions have suffered less, the most striking contrast to Latin-
America's performance coming in the "middle-income" countries of East Asia
and the Pacific which are among Latin-America's leading rivals in exporting
manufactured goods. Thanks to a remarkable export performance their GDP
growth has been sustained at high rates averaging about 8 percent a year.
6
Latin-America's troubles have continued since 1977. Preliminary estimates
show GDP growth of about 4.7 percent in the region in 1978, and the purchas-
ing power of its exports fell rather sharply in that year due mainly to adverse
price trends in key commodities such as coffee.
724 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Table 5
GROWTH OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND MERCHANDISE TRADE IN
FOUR GROUPS OF COUNTRIES, 1965-74 AND 1974-77
(percent per annum in 1975 dollars
a)
Industrial Latin All developing Developing


































Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1979, Table 11; OECD
National Accounts; UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, October 1979.
Except for industrial countries' exports and imports which are based
on UN quantum indexes (1975=100).
"Middle income" countries only — principally Republic of Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand.
Table 6 shows some of the parallels and links year by year between growth
and trade in industrial countries and in Latin America. The table is arranged
to tell the story and to reveal the transmission mechanism, except that some
parts, such as export price changes, are left out. The main influence runs from
the industrial countries to Latin America. Trends in industrial countries,
especially in their manufacturing output, show up quickly in their imports,
leading to immediate repercussions on the volume and also (though not
shown) the prices of their exports. With a slight lag, less than one year, export
troubles affect the region's imports, and in major setbacks GDP is soon af-
fected. Presumably in the longer run, growth performance is further affected
by the influence of perceived export trends on the region's capacity to borrow
to pay for imports.
GDP fluctuations in the developed countries transmit themselves to most
parts of Latin America, as can be seen in Table 7. Important features of the
industrial countries' growth pattern have had their counterparts throughout
the region, usually in the form of smaller fluctuations than those in the indus-
trial North.
Despite these shared vicissitudes, a look at trends in export volume in indus-
trial Latin-American countries (Table 8) shows that there is more at work
than outside influences. Export performance in the region has varied widely in
individual countries. Most have experienced a slower growth rate in 1970-77
than in 1960-70 — indeed several have suffered declines in recent years.
8 Seven
economies, however, have expanded their exports faster in the 1970s. In mostEXPORTS AND POLICY 25
Table 6
HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES AND
LATIN AMERICA IN "REAL" GROWTH RATES OF GDP, MANUFACTURING





















































































































Sources: World Bank, World Development Report, 197% Tables 11 and 13; UN
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, January, April, August, and October 1979;
World Bank Economic Analysis and Projections Department, data bank, supple-
mented by staff estimates. Note that some of the 1974-77 numbers are from
different sources than the year-by-year numbers and may not be wholle consis-
tent with them.
aNot including Cuba, at least in the GDP series.
Preliminary estimate.
cases these higher growth rates have been associated with a shift in national
policy, placing greater emphasis on export expansion. Comparison of Table 8
with Table 7 shows that, in Argentina and Chile, positive effects of export
volume on GDP growth were slow to materialize up to 1977; unfavorable
price trends in major exports have been partly responsible for this. In 1977-
79, however, Chile's GDP is estimated to have grown at over 8 percent a year




The general expectations for the next few years is for slow and erratic GDP
growth in industrial countries, erratically rising energy prices combined with
uncertainties of supply, worldwide inflation met by periodic efforts to combat
it through conservative fiscal and monetary policies, and in consequence, a slow
growth of world trade. Military threats and political instability in Western
Asia add to the uncertainties. In these circumstances, the major question in
projections today is how gloomy one should make them. Given the renewed26 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
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Table 8
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF EXPORTS IN LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES,
1960-70 COMPARED WITH 1970-77 (percent per annum In "real" terms;









































































Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1979, Annex, Tables 1 and 8.
increases in energy prices over the past year, the new recession, and the worsen-
ing of world inflation, there is room to project even slower GDP growth in
the industrial countries through 1985 than the 3.4 percent achieved in the 1970s.
Economic growth is being slowed largely by what is happening in the private
sector — notably by a lack of private investment caused, presumably, by un-
certainty, low expectations, low savings in face of inflation, and a squeeze on
profits. Meanwhile, productivity growth has wilted due to features of the indus-
trial economies that will not change quickly — widespread government inter-
vention, inflation and its interaction with tax and other incentives, slow trade
growth, changing attitudes toward work and risk-taking if only because of
welfare and tax systems, increased expenditures and regulations to protect the
environment, insufficient past investment, changing structural features of the
richest economies such as the growing importance of services with their limited
opportunities to raise productivity, changing age and sex composition of the
labor force, inflexibility of political institutions preventing governments from
correcting outworn policies, and the dead weight of physical capital no longer
appropriate for increasing productivity. Some observers would attribute at least
part of the problem to a down period in technological innovation and others
would point mainly to the energy situation. Whatever may be at fault, however,
most explanations suggest that it will not soon be corrected. Only a handful
of newly industrializing countries can be expected to do well in the next few
years based on their momentum and recent investments.
While a few experts expect the negative conditions to last through the 1980s,
most observers are uncertain and agnostic in regard to economic trends past
about 1985, anticipating that what happens then may well be shaped by28 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
forces we do not understand well today or by unexpected developments in the
intervening years. However, even if favorable trends occur in the second half
of the 1980s they will take some time to gather momentum, so that one can
expect only modest growth in the decade as a whole.
In turning ideas such as these into quantitative forecasts one has to contend
with a paucity of published projections applying to the medium-term future.
Although much is written that touches lightly on the subject, the only recent
medium-term projections for 1980 through 1990 are those of the World Bank
in its World Development Report, 1979.
10
World Bank Protection
In retrospect most people would view these World Bank projections as
optimistic, even at the time they were made. They assumed GDP growth in
industrial economies from 1980-90 at 4.2 percent, about halfway between the
rates of the 1970s and those of the 1960s, and no further increase in the real
price of energy, even though projections based on this assumption turned out
to show world demand outstripping world supply toward 1990.
1
1 Obviously
these assumptions would no longer be made today, and indeed, the energy
price began rising above the projected level just before the report came out.
The report also included a "low case" based on 3.5 percent GDP growth in
industrial countries but with no rise in energy prices. In each case, further
assumptions had to be made which included a conservative pattern of private
commercial borrowing by developing countries.
Tables 9 and 10 show some results of the base case and low case projections.
In contrast to these projections, the past relationships shown in previous tables
indicate that the decline in GDP growth rates in Latin America tends to be
smaller than the GDP decrease in industrial countries giving rise to it; thus
it is unlikely that a one-point decline in the growth rate of world trade and
of Latin-America's exports from the base to the low case would lead to a re-
duction of over 1 percent in Latin America's GDP. The 1965-74 and 1974-78
comparison involves a fall of over four points in the growth of both world
trade and Latin-American exports, associated with a decline of a little over
two points in Latin America's GDP growth rate. On this basis one would
expect a decline of only about half a point.
However, to the extent that bad news is expected in the world economy in
the first half of the 1980s, the "low case" projection of 4.6 percent GDP
growth in Latin America could nevertheless be close to the mark, since the
region's GDP seems to have been increasing at no more than this rate from
1974 to 1978. Still, this is not a mechanical relationship, and the region may
have a potential for doing better within existing constraints. The base case
projections for the 1980 World Development Report are being built aroundEXPORTS AND POLICY 29
Table 9
BASE CASE AND LOW CASE PROJECTIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA, ALL DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1980-90 (average annual percentage
growth rates at 1975 prices)
WORLD ECONOMY
GDP of Industrialized countries
Real price of energy
World merchandise trade
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Net private medium- and long-term loans














Imports of goods and nonfactor services
Merchandise f.o.b.
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report, 1979, Tables 16 and 17;
World Bank, Economic Analysis & Projections Department.
industrial country GDP growth in the 1980s at somewhere between 3 and
3.5 percent a year, along with a rising price of energy. What will this do to
the growth projections for the volume of exports from Latin America? Its
volume growth, paradoxically, might not be reduced much. Fuel, which would
be nearly half the total exports in today's prices, will not fall and may rise in
response to the higher prices. Meanwhile the oil-importing countries of the
region will not be able to slacken their export efforts; on the contrary they
are being moved to try harder to export, even if this requires reductions in
consumption and investment. Finally, momentum provided by existing policies
and programs will not necessarily change, and export expansion appears to
depend more on policies and supply conditions within the region than stimuli
from outside. In sum, Latin America's export results depend mainly on the
countries' success in improving their own supply performance, which may










































BASE CASE EXPORT PROJECTIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA, 1980-90
























































Source: World Bank, Economic Analysis and Projections Department.
Components may not add up to totals because of rounding.
Fuels and Energy
There are large contrasts in energy balances in Latin America, as shown in
Table 11. Six countries are net exporters based on crude oil and natural gas;
together they had 110 million people in 1978. Two more countries, Argentina
and Colombia, with 52 million people in 1978, are able to cover practically
all of their energy requirements out of their own production. Brazil and Chile
with 130 million people in that year had not nearly enough fossil fuel output
to cover their requirements, while the other 15 countries shown, with 56 mil-
lion people in 1978, have no significant primary energy output apart from
hydroelectric plants and the expanding but still small oil production from
Guatemala; thus all are dependent on imports. Brazil, with relatively low
export earnings per head, devotes the largest share of its imports to fuel and
will have to pay at least $10 billion for its oil imports in 1980 compared with
$3.75 billion in 1977, even though import volume will be only about 17 per-
cent higher.
Among the oil-producing countries, Mexico has been rapidly increasing its
output and continues to discover big new oil fields. Meanwhile, output has been
declining over time and this is expected to continue in Venezuela, Colombia,
and Bolivia, while in the future output is expected to decline sharply in Peru
and Ecuador, with the former ceasing to export by mid-decade. Argentina
along with Trinidad and Tobago can probably expand output a little.EXPORTS AND POLICY 31
Table 11
CONSUMPTION, NET EXPORTS AND NET IMPORTS OF PRIMARY ENERGY AND PRODUCTION OF CRUDE





































































































































Source: United Nations, World Energy Supplies 1973-1978, Table 5.
aExcluding bunkers, that is, fueling of ships and aircraft.
Other Primary Commodities
In most primary products, apart from coffee, bananas, and bauxite, Latin-
American countries are relatively small suppliers compared with the world
market, so that within limits they can potentially expand their exports faster
than the rest of the world without triggering a major slide in the price, although
in a few other commodities, such as copper and cocoa, the world price may
be quite sensitive to output from Latin-American suppliers, and in beef their
scope for expanding exports is constrained by quotas.
With rare exceptions, however, in projecting their exports in the 1980s
Latin-American countries must be less concerned with world demand than
with future price trends. Table 12 shows the prices of Latin-America's lead-
ing commodity exports, other than fuel, in 1979 by comparison with 1970-74,
a period of fairly high prices by historical standards. The table also shows as
a measure of price instability the annual average change in the "real" price32 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Table 12
PRICES OF SELECTED COMMODITIES OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO LATIN AMERICA
IN 1979 AS A PERCENT OF AVERAGE PRICES IN 1970-74 AND 1965-69, IN









































































































Source: Unpublished tables from World Bank, Commodities and Export Projec-
tions Division, Economic Analysis and Projections Department.
Computed as a deviation from a moving average,
using "real" price.
x 1/n x 100,
in the period 1953-78, computed as a deviation from a moving average. With
the exception of coffee, where the price has been raised by frosts in Brazil in
recent years, and the further exceptions of cocoa, tin, and bauxite, commodity
prices in 1979 were well below the average price levels of 1965-74. Thus, while
the prices of coffee and cocoa can be expected to weaken in the 1980s, many
of the other prices may actually firm up despite weak growth in the world
economy. In sugar, for example, prices have been depressed in the late 1970s
below long-run costs of production, but they are now up sharply despite Euro-
pean Community exports of beet sugar at flagrantly subsidized prices. As an-
other example, the price of copper began to rebound some months ago and
supply may be tight at times in the next decade due to little investment in the
1970s. More generally, most metal and mineral prices can be expected to hold
up apart from temporary setbacks, and as many countries' food and feed
deficits continue to increase, this is also true of the prices of a number of agri-
cultural products.EXPORTS AND POLICY 33
Table 13
MANUFACTURED EXPORTS*
1 FROM LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN 1976
(value in million US dollars)

























































Sources: World Development Report, 1979, World Development
Indicators, Table 12; UN, Yearbook of International Trade
Statistics, 1977; and US International Trade Commission,
"Tariff Items 807.00 and 806.30, US Imports for Consumption,
Specified Years 1966-78," August 1979.
aManufactured exports are defined here as SITC 5-9 less 68.
This excludes practically all border assembly ("maquila") ex-
ports. US imports from Mexico under Tariff Items 806.30 and
807.00 were valued f.o.b. at $1,135 million; almost all of this
would have been manufactured for a total of over 2,100.
Mainly alumina.
Countries such as Haiti, heavily involved in offshore assembly
for the US market, have considerably larger exports based on
US import statistics, but only report their own country's value
added in this production.
Manufactures
Manufactured exports have been expanding rapidly, and this growth ap-
pears to be continuing year after year. In current prices their value rose from
$2 billion in 1970 to $17.6 billion in 1978 [13; and 11, May 1980, special table
D]. Table 13 shows the value of these exports in individual countries in 1976;
since then the largest growth has taken place in Brazil where the value of
these exports rose, by the same definition, to $4,334 million in 1978 and perhaps
$5.5 billion in 1979.
1
2
As a result of modest wage levels dictated by population pressure, a number
of countries in Central America, the Caribbean, Colombia, and Peru are
emerging with a comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactures. Brazil
has displayed a huge industrial export potential based mainly on its econ-
omies of scale and growing technical sophistication; Argentina, Chile, and34 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Uruguay have the know-how to combine quality output with suitable specializa-
tion; and there are export potentials based on experience gained from natural
resource advantages — for example, Argentina is a potentially strong exporter
of agricultural equipment, Mexico of equipment for the oil and gas industries
among others, Peru of fishing boats, and Chile of mining equipment and tech-
nical assistance in mineral exploration. In addition, of course, natural resource
advantages are exploited directly in manufacturing for export.
Up to now, most Latin-American countries have been defensive about their
manufacturing abilities and have impeded their own export success through
excessive protection and other measures that increase costs artificially, includ-
ing high-cost fringe benefits and big indemnities for dismissing workers. Lack
of access to imported inputs is a major problem in most countries, along with
excessive costs of inputs and artificially high profits to be made in the domestic
market. Administrative obstacles to exports abound. By way of compensation,
some Latin-American countries provide export subsidies to manufactures com-
bined with export taxes on their traditional natural resource exports, thus
creating powerful but exceedingly uneven incentives for manufactures export
based on local natural resources. Peru and Uruquay are prime examples today.
Other artificial means are used to promote manufactured exports, for example,
arrangements in which imports by industrial enterprises — or low-interest
loans to them, or local assembly of automobiles — are only permitted in re-
turn for exports. One result is that exports of manufactures are frequently pro-
duced at costs well above world prices and are cross-subsidized by local con-
sumers. Indeed, revalued at world prices, value added in many of these
manufacturing activities for export would quite likely be negative. In a few lo-
cations, however, Latin-American countries allow access to imported inputs and
permit the composition of manufactured exports to be shaped by comparative
advantage — in the Mexican border assembly industry, in a few export-pro-
cessing zones in the Caribbean, and now increasingly in Chile, where tariffs
have been reduced to 10 percent or less.
Looking forward to the 1980s, although there is a great potential for manu-
factured export growth, one can also find reasons for worrying whether the
region will in fact keep up, let alone improve, its export performance. One
reason is the artificiality and costliness of much of the exporting. Local sup-
plies of cotton, leather, wool, and natural resources used in exports are strictly
limited; so are the exports generated as a side effect of excess capacity; and
government leverage to induce enterprises to export in exchange for favorable
treatment is also limited. Thus, beyond a certain point, better performance
depends on improving policy regimes to give favorable export incentives to a
wider set of manufacturing industries.
At a country level, one also finds concrete room for concern. In Brazil, for
example, following the December 1979 package of reforms, there is a questionEXPORTS AND POLICY 35
whether devaluations from now on will keep up with inflation. In Mexico,
problems arise from the effects of oil: there is less incentive to industrialize
efficiently and pay strong attention to nonfuel exports, and wages are being
driven up compared with wages in the US and elsewhere, as an indirect
effect of spending brought on by the oil bonanza; thus the outlook for manu-
factured exports is cloudy. In Argentina, Uruguay, and Colombia manufac-
tured exports are being hurt by exchange rate appreciation brought about by
natural resource exports, capital inflows, and attempts to fight inflation through
currency appreciation; in a smaller way Peru may now run into the same
problem. In much of Central America manufactured exports are being dis-
rupted by political troubles.
Lack of momentum in world demand will also be a problem, because in
many products Latin-American suppliers seem to be marginal and their orders
are cut back more than those of East Asian suppliers when demand falls. This
may be cushioned by the fact that 45 percent of the region's manufactured
exports go to other Latin-American countries (see [14, Special table D]), but,
of course, their ability to pay for each other's output and their willingness to
import depends on their policy regimes and on the health of their own bal-
ances of payments.
Protection in industrial countries could hurt the region, but so far it has not
had serious repercussions on manufactured exports. The only products hit
systematically by quotas up to now have been textiles and clothing. To date,
although a few of the quotas in the region are binding, the effects have been
mild, and indeed the exports achieved up to now — notably by sewing in
Mexico and the Caribbean of precut garments for the US market — have
benefited to some extent from the price-raising effects of strict quotas on the
formidable rival suppliers in East Asia.
1
3 Outside textile products, one finds
threats and annoyances, notably in the form of US countervailing duties
against export subsidies by Latin-American countries, but hardly anything
more. The most palpable threats come in steel, where Brazil already has year-
to-year agreements limiting its exports to the European community, and in
shoes where, for example, US "orderly marketing arrangements" with Taiwan
and Korea offer warnings to Brazil. With the US having already committed
itself to a confirmation of strict textile quotas, as part of the price of achiev-
ing the Tokyo Round package of trade agreements, the industrial countries
could slip into greater use of protection in the next few years, but even in a
period of depressed growth this outcome is far from certain. Indeed, some
observers have expressed surprise that more serious barriers have not emerged
outside textiles and clothing. Even if barriers multiply, there is considerable
likelihood that, as in the past, only the star performers will be hit by restric-
tions, and the countries affected will be sufficiently flexible to go around the
restrictions and also to raise their prices of the products by way of compensation.36 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Economic Growth Prospects
If GDP in the industrial countries grows between 3 and 3.5 percent a year
in the 1980s and no big surprises occur, GDP growth in Latin America as a
whole could average 5 percent, with lower growth rates in years of adverse
conditions.
Growth rates higher than this, above 6 percent a year, can be expected in
Mexico thanks to its oil revenues. Brazil and Argentina are the biggest question
marks, since both now face very difficult tasks in economic management —
Brazil is trying to keep up its dynamism in face of a payments crunch and
other growing difficulties, and Argentina is trying to right its policy environ-
ment to break out of its usual slow and erratic growth. Colombia even in face
of lower coffee prices can potentially continue to grow at least as fast as the
region as a whole; Venezuela and Ecuador with their declining volume of
energy exports might fade to only average growth rates once oil prices level
out; Chile having made its drastic transition to outward-looking policies will
grow at well above the average rate, thanks to fast-growing trade; and Uru-
guay and Paraguay will do better than the average, assuming that they con-
tinue to shift their internal terms of trade in favor of agriculture. Conversely,
however, I would be pessimistic about the growth prospects of Peru and
Bolivia, with oil exports disappearing, and of most of Central America be-
cause of political instability. In the Caribbean, poor results can be expected
in Cuba and Jamaica, and only modest growth in Haiti as a legacy of policy
shortcomings, while the Dominican Republic may be able to achieve at least
average growth as the price of sugar recovers.
POLICY ISSUES
Three Questions Not Yet Fully Answered
Three questions hang over economic policy in many Latin-American coun-
tries. The first is, what trade policies should an industrial country follow to
keep up its economic growth as best possible in the face of reduced demand for
its exports, higher prices for its (large) fuel imports, or both together? The
second is, what regional measures can usefully be taken by Latin-American
countries acting together in face of such a jolt from outside? Finally, what
strategy should be followed by a developing country rich in natural resources,
in order to move rapidly into the ranks of the fully industrialized countries?
Policy for an Industrial County in Face of Depressed Export Demand
or a Jump in the Price of Fuel Imports
Sustaining economic growth in face of depressed export demand or a sharp
rise in the price of fuel imports turns out to bear a close analytical resemblance
to a familiar question: how can a developing country increase its growth rate
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big increase in the country's requirement for goods initially imported, since
more capital equipment and intermediate inputs will be needed and imports
will also be required to break bottlenecks and overcome shortages or gaps in
what the country can supply for itself once its resources become tightly
stretched. Thus, the country's demand for foreign exchange will shift outward
compared with a continuation of the present growth rate; yet the supply of
exports will not be increased immediately, but will tend to be reduced by
rising domestic demand. Another problem is that raising the growth target
implies a need to use trade policy more than before to help get more output
out of existing resources of the economy, both directly in current production
and over time through the efficiency of investment and the mix of activities
chosen for expansion.
Maintaining growth when exports fall or when the cost of imports rises,
poses essentially the same two challenges: exports must be raised and import
needs reduced to bring payments back into balance, and the economy must
attain more output from resources available. Thus it is not entirely surprising
to find that trade policy recommendations in both negative cases will be
broadly similar to those now generally accepted for promoting growth through
improved trade policy. In each case, the broad prescription must be to promote
exports along with efficient import substitution, and to use the incentives and
price signals created by trade and exchange rate policy to foster a better use
of resources and a more efficient pattern of growth throughout the economy.
For these purposes the policy requirements are by now familiar: more realistic
prices and exchange rates, reflecting to the extent possible, the true scarcity
value of foreign exchange and factors; provision of equal incentives to the
extent possible to production for export and for the domestic market, at least
within the same industry; special attention to input needs of exports including,
if possible, a free trade regime for imported inputs into exports and equal in-
centives for the use of domestically produced inputs; further use of trade
opportunities and recommended methods of project appraisal in choosing
investment patterns; and so on. There exist, however, significant differences in
the three cases calling for different actions in detail. Thus, in the case of
depressed exports caused by a depressed world economy, increased exports
will be harder to achieve and smaller export results can be expected than in
the other two cases, from any given shift of policy designed to promote ex-
ports. Meanwhile there will also be some idle resources in the economy, so
that improved trade policy is likely to lead naturally to more import substitu-
tion, but less aggressive export expansion than in the first case; while a jolt
from high fuel costs will call for shifts into activities that directly or indirectly
save energy.
The real difficulty is that when the trouble hits, countries are in fact fol-
lowing policies full of distortions. Thus they cannot quickly move to the recom-38 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
mended policies. Indeed, given the immediacy of the payment problem, the
crisis must be met at first with the policy instruments at hand. Moreover, the
technical and practical difficulties of achieving a transition to better policies
may be especially serious in face of a jolt from abroad, especially since "natural"
responses such as emergency quotas, embargoes, and import surcharges will
increase incentive distortions.
There is a silver lining, however, because the setback from abroad will create
pressure to make policy adjustments in directions needed anyway. In another
paper I made recommendations for effecting a transition from the usual kind
of inferior trade policy regime to a desirable one, starting in a difficult pay-
ment crisis (see [3]). Looking back at this list it seems that many of the actions
recommended are ones that a sensible government would be inclined to take
anyway in reaction to a sharp rise in oil import costs or a prolonged drop in
earnings from traditional exports. What is especially worth noting, however,
is that political support can probably be found for these actions in face of a
setback to trade and growth originating outside, when there was no previous
consensus on accelerating the country's growth by expanding its trade.
Among my tentative recommendations for transition, starting in the difficult
case of a payments imbalance, were to
(1) Look ahead and design a program of phased adjustments and corrections
over a number of years, culminating with much larger exports and imports
and higher rates of economic growth. Faster growth and development is the
basic objective, not an optimal trade regime for its own sake.
(2) Start by correcting the exchange rate and by expanding exports with the
help of strong new incentives, even if this involves second-best approaches that
will later be abandoned.
(3) Make import policy changes at first only to give the export industries ac-
cess to imported as well as local inputs at world prices; otherwise wait to re-
form the import regime until exports increase to the point where quotas and
high tariffs can be phased out; but meanwhile try not to introduce new import
restrictions that will be hard to abandon later.
(4) Follow up a strong initial devaluation, which will help import substitution
as well as exports, by further actions to correct prices and to reduce inflation
— try to increase public revenues, hold down public expenditures, and espe-
cially foreign exchange expenditures, where there should be a stringent for-
eign exchange budget, make interest rates and public sector prices realistic,
reduce fringe costs of labor to employers, and so on.
(5) Take special measures to relieve the short-run credit squeeze on all but
the least promising industrial enterprises, to keep them going through the
crisis despite higher costs of working capital due to devaluation and higher
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(6) Channel available foreign exchange into inputs to maintain current pro-
duction ahead of most investment,
1* then increase investment as foreign ex-
change becomes more abundant.
(7) Meanwhile switch investment into useful projects with low foreign-ex-
change requirements or quick returns in saving or earning foreign exchange,
keeping the level of investment high enough to avoid unemployment on any
large scale in the construction industries.
(8) Make careful plans for expanding the level of national development
effort and accelerating the rate of growth through actions by the public, as
well as the private, sector as import capacity grows. The increasing level of
economic activity will more than compensate industries for gradually losing
most of their protection, and the exchange rates required for this growth will
give considerable "protection" to established industries.
This list has a twofold significance for a country hit by depressed exports or
a higher import bill. First, it is at least one guide as to what to do and in what
order. Second, the fact that it was initially made to guide a transition to better
trade policy shows that it is only a short step from the actions required anyway,
to a lasting improvement in the trade policy regime. Having corrected many
exchange rate and price distortions, the country can move on to tackle the
politically difficult business of reducing protection at a later stage when exports
are booming and import controls become redundant.
Policy Action at a Regional Level
Setbacks in the world economy increase the incentive to undertake efficient
measures to save or earn foreign exchange through regional cooperation, while
at the same time they increase the costs of regional schemes that have the
opposite effect. Thus "regional self-sufficiency" or "regional import substitu-
tion" is an appropriate response if it means, for example, building a fertilizer
plant to serve several Andean Group countries at costs lower than those of
imports, while scrapping plans for separate plants in each country, or if it
means striving for more intraregional trade and division of labor within exist-
ing agreements, but not if it means creating new distortions and artificial bar-
riers. The real goal must be to increase the efficiency of production, while
earning and saving foreign exchange. For this purpose, it would be useful, for
example, to do more joint promotion of tourism, to aim for more production
of motor vehicle and tractor parts in Brazil and Argentina for both markets
to take further advantage of economies of scale and help expand exports from
both countries, and to create payments facilities at a regional level along the
lines of the European Payments Union, to help facilitate purchase from one
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Further reciprocal preferential measures can help where, as in Brazil, severe
obstacles still exist against imports, but perhaps even more important in pro-
moting a swift growth of trade within Latin America are the steps being taken
in some countries to make exchange rates realistic, reduce exchange controls,
liberalize tariffs, and eliminate quantitative import restrictions. As a matter
of geography and information costs, when Chile and Argentina do this, it has
an especially big effect on their trade with one another. The trend in major
countries toward reliance on realistic exchange rates and tariffs, rather than
exchange controls and quantitative restrictions, also means that existing tariff
preferences, which once meant very little, now begin to count. Thus, with the
help of outward-looking policies, a Latin-American common market is start-
ing finally to become a reality, to the point where the next few years may wit-
ness a swift growth of trade among the leading countries based on private,
commercial self-interest and decentralized decision-making.
How Does a Resource-Rich Country Quickly Become Fully Developed?
In most countries of Latin America, the basic challenge starting in the 1980s
is to move quickly and decisively toward becoming fully industrialized, "de-
veloped" countries, with high living standards that are not dependent to any
large degree on rents from natural resources. For "models" of how to do this
in a country with a predominantly European culture and fairly substantial
rental resources per head, one would have to turn to such countries as Spain,
Greece, and Finland. In these and other countries that have industrialized
within the 20th century, the drive to a fully industrialized status has featured
rapid export growth, with the main thrust coming in manufactured exports.
As the experience of many Latin-American countries helps to show, however,
this crucial phase of the development process may be difficult to achieve in
a country rich in natural resources, since this resource wealth may stand in
the way, preventing industries from becoming fully competitive because of the
high wage costs, easygoing standards, and inferior policy regimes fostered by a
cushion of natural-resource-based exports.
How, then, can a resource-rich country achieve full development rapidly?
Not enough is known as yet about the answers, but my own tentative answer
would start with one word: quality. The country must strive for quality by
international standards in its manufactured exports, its other goods and ser-
vices, its equipment and infrastructure, its government and economic institu-
tions; and it must seek to increase rapidly the quality of its human resources
through educational standards and practical experience, above all in areas
such as engineering, technology, and marketing. The attainment of quality
will require a strong quantitative performance as well through decades of
suitable experience and wise investments, and the shift to full development
will require changes in people's attitudes and ways of living at the same time.EXPORTS AND POLICY 41
Today some Latin-American countries are obviously decades closer to full de-
velopment than others. Without the pursuit of quality on a broad front, how-
ever, even a resource-rich country cannot expect to become fully developed.
Almost equally important, and intimately related, is the need to expand
manufactured exports rapidly, in ways that can be sustained based on learn-
ing and true competitiveness. This frees the country to a degree from con-
straints set by its capacity to import, its natural resource base, and the size
of its home market; and it generates or reveals an ability to compete success-
fully with the richer countries of the world across a wide spectrum of industries
in the home market as well as abroad. Trade growth also permits a rapid
rise in output, investment, and living standards during the drive to full indus-
trialization.
From this point of view, the heart of the policy problem in a resource-rich
country such as Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, or Mexico, is how to> make and
keep its industries competitive in face of the wage, exchange rate, and indirect
social, cultural, political, and other effects of its resource riches. Exchange rate
policy may be one of the answers. I would want to resort to special measures
in this regard to keep wages and prices competitive, even if this means running
a trade surplus that is neutralized or invested abroad to reduce the inflation-
ary effects. Also important is to work continually to improve the country's
infrastructure, education, and public services, which will affect quality and
thus export competitiveness. Improving the scale, structure, and costs of in-
dustries may be crucial. Trade policy is certainly a key by making the price
system realistic, liberalizing imports, and promoting exports in ways already
discussed. Experience in Canada and Western Europe suggests that steps to-
ward free trade and economic integration with industrially advanced neigh-
bors may be nearly essential for many countries in making and keeping indus-
tries fully competitive, a point that deserves careful consideration in Mexico
and that suggests long-run possibilities in the area around Brazil and Argen-
tina. Here steps to liberalize imports should be valued, above all, for their
indirect contribution to the ability to raise output quality and to compete in
export markets.
NOTES
* The views expressed are mine and are not necessarily those of the World Bank.
1. This and other data in this paragraph are from [18, Table 1], and are limited
to countries with populations of over one million in 1977. Per capita growth rates for
the years 1970-77, in countries of all sizes, are given in [16].
2. Much comparative information can be found in [5 and 18].
3. As a result, in 1975 prices, the region's exports were only two-thirds as large rela-
tive to its GDP in 1976 as in 1960, according to unpublished World Bank estimates
made as background for [17]. For simplicity this paper will only treat merchandise
exports. However, by 1977, according to World Bank estimates, exports of nonfactor42 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
services from the region were valued at nearly one-third as much as the region's
merchandise exports, and from 1970-76 they grew in constant 1975 prices at 6.6 per-
cent a year compared with 2.8 percent a year for merchandise exports.
4. Manufactures defined as SITC 5-8 less 68 constituted 14.4 percent of the
regions's total merchandise exports and 21.6 percent of nonfuel exports in 1977,
according to [11, May 1979, Special Table D].
5. In 1978 the average manufacturing wage in Taiwan exclusive of fringe bene-
fits, reached 80 US cents per hours or $7.02 per day ($176.14 per month), up from
41 cents an hour or $3.57 per day as recently as 1974. In Hong Kong the average
manufacturing wage in 1978 was $7.21 per day and in Korea, $7.52 per day, whereas
the Korean average stood at only $9.24 per day as recently as 1974. Lower wages
than these are found now in many Latin-American countries, especially in relatively
low-skilled, low-wage industries. (These comparisons are based on data from [8; 9;
11, December 1979, pp. xvii and 146; and 1], and exchange rates from [2].) At an
industry-specific level, Morawetz found higher wages with or without fringe benefits
in the clothing (garment) industry in the East Asian economies just named than
in Colombia, where garment workers earned 30 cents per hour ([6, pp. 104-108]).
6. In the 1974-78 period, while exports in the world as a whole grew at only
about 4 percent per annum, those of Korea grew in real terms at 23 percent per
annum, those of Taiwan at 19 percent per annum, and even those of Hong Kong
grew at 9 percent per annum; see [2, pp. 114-15 and 238-39; and 14, p. 571].
7. The first figure is from [15]. According to International Monetary Fund data
the region's exports grew in nominal value in 1978 at only 5 to 6 percent compared
with a rise of about 15.5 percent in the value of world trade; meanwhile, as shown
in [11, December 1979, Special Table D], the US dollar unit value of developed
countries' manufactured exports rose through inflation by about 14.6 percent.
8. The statistics in the table are misleading in the case of Colombia because of
increasing unreported drug transactions and in Trinidad and Tobago because ex-
ports of its own oil increased, while those based on refining of Venezuelan oil fell.
9. Based on interviews with Chilean authorities, in real terms GDP rose 8.6 per-
cent in 1977, 7.9 percent in 1978, and 8.5 percent according to their (ODEPLAN)
estimates.
10. Some mention should be made, however, of OECD scenarios for the years
1975-2000 in [7] which imply a wide range of possibilities for 1990.
11. [17, Tables 16 and 24 on pp. 17 and 35]. The underlying model contains no
feedback from energy effects to prices and output.
12. [14] and recent statistics in Brazilian classifications from Banco do Brasil.
13. Textile quotas and their effects are analyzed in [4]. Within the region, the US
has textile quotas at present against Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Haiti,
and Mexico; the European Community has quota agreements with Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Guatemala, Haiti and Uruguay, although the last three
agreements contain no quotas, only agreements to negotiate and accept quotas if
exports rise to specified levels; and among the other industrial countries the only
quotas against Latin-American textile products appear to be those in Austria restrict-
ing cotton yarn and printed fabric from Brazil.
14. Investment in human resources through education, training, health programs,
and the like ought to continue unabated, however; foreign exchange requirements are
generally slight.EXPORTS AND POLICY 43
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Comment on "Exports and Policy
in Latin-American Countries"
Rudiger Dornbusch
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Keesing leaves little doubt that Latin America is not his favorite export per-
former, either in primary commodities or in manufactures, either in the past
or in the future. Export performance is described as "slow, miserable, ever
lagging" and is unfavorably compared with what has been achieved elsewhere.
The reasons for the sub-par performance are suggested: policies biased against
manufactures exports through restrictions of access to intermediate inputs,
favoring production for the home market, high wages, lack of competitiveness44 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
due to favorable natural resource endowments, and generally unfavorable ex-
change rate and commercial policy. The remedies suggested amount, in so
many words, to achieving competitiveness by setting prices "right." In what
follows I shall question some of Keesing's conclusions, if only to suggest that
there may be room for alternative views.
LATIN-AMERICAN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Keesing observes that Latin-American performance, while satisfactory by
historical standards, has been mediocre compared with what has been achieved
by countries at comparable levels of development in other parts of the world.
Table 1 questions these conclusions and shows real growth rates and growth
rates of export earnings in real terms for all non-oil LDCs, for Asia and the
Western Hemisphere, covering various subperiods from 1967 to 1980.
One is hard-pressed, indeed, to see a substantial difference in the 1970s be-
tween Asia and Latin America. The comparison of larger aggregates, as sug-
gested here, reveals the tendency for each region to have an average behavior
and to deemphasize the superior performance of places such as Sao Paulo,
Seoul, or Singapore.
I would also question the extent, more particularly the channels, through
which the business cycle in industrialized countries spills over to developing
areas. Keesing believes that within a year a deceleration in industrial coun-
tries' growth spills over into volumes and prices in the developing countries,
soon bringing about a setback in growth. Surprisingly, the evidence is really
not that strong. Consider the Brazilian growth rate of GNP, export volume,
and the OEGD GNP growth rates as shown in Table 2.
Table 2 reveals the uneven pattern of Brazilian real growth, and the even
more erratic growth rates of manufacturing exports in volume terms. There
is a temptation to look to 1975 as a vindication of the view that a decline in
Brazilian export growth, due to reduced growth in industrialized countries, led
to lower income growth. Given the very small share of exports in GNP that
Table 1



















































Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Tables 2.9 and 10.
aReal export denotes export earnings deflated by import prices.
Partners GNP refers to growth rate of trading partners' GNP.
Commodity prices denotes the dollar prices of the regions nonoil primary commodities.EXPORTS AND POLICY 45
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view is, however, not correct. Export performance, as 1977 and 1978 make
clear, does not exercise a dominating role on income growth and, more im-
portant, export behavior is primarily governed by home market conditions and
profitability, not by world demand. The fact is brought out in a particularly
strong way by the 1977-78 evidence. 1975 by contrast, reflects low real income
growth because of a homemade reduction in demand in an effort to stabilize
inflation.
There is no doubt about the strong cyclical behavior of commodity prices,
but for manufactures one does not in fact observe a pattern that is strongly
cyclical. Manufactures exports are, to a significant extent, dominated by home
supply and macroeconomic conditions, not by world demand. LDCs, while
marginal suppliers, made their strongest inroads at the very time of slack de-
mand in developed countries. I find this one of the very puzzling facts of
the LDG export performance and one that at present goes without an ex-
planation.
EXPORTS AND GROWTH
Keesing takes a firm position on the issue of trade and growth. In his view
exports are the source of growth. Indeed, he goes as far as ascribing Brazilian
supergrowth in 1967-74 to swiftly rising exports. Surely that is an argument
that has no basis whatsoever, once it is remembered that in the case of Brazil
exports account for less than 10 percent of GNP. The same is, of course, ap-
parent from a comparison of export and growth performance for several Latin-
American countries. Table 3 reveals little association between export growth
and real income growth. There are cases such as Chile where repressed do-
mestic activity and overdepreciation lead to high export growth but, of course,
at the expense of domestic activity. There is the Brazilian case where high
export growth ensures that trade problems do not become a bottleneck for a
growth process that is centered at home. And then, of course, there are a num-
ber of countries where no precise pattern emerges.
I would expect that only the Brazilian pattern makes much sense: strong
export performance so that the growth process is not hampered by external
constraints. The alternative strategy of seeking high export growth through a
cut in real wages and under-valued exports is certainly a vehicle for fast46 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
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export growth, but it is rarely a recipe for economic success. (In making that
assertion, one must, of course, bear in mind that in Far East Asia it was the
recipe for high, broadly shared growth in per capita incomes.)
The "growth through exports" strategy that international organizations have
adopted as their economic ideology for developing countries has a side aspect
that has not been sufficiently emphasized, namely, that the contrived compe-
tition between LDCs as new manufacturing suppliers cannot but affect their
terms of trade adversely. The process affects their terms of trade adversely as
they seek to expand and it does so even more when, in reaction to external
shocks, they attempt to maintain their relative shares through competitive
depreciation and real wage cutting. Since LDCs are now competing among
themselves for the import levels that developed countries have conceded, the
export competition involves to an important extent implicit transfers toward
final consumers in the developed countries. This is an implication of the growth
through exports strategy applied to LDCs as a group and its international
income distribution implications need serious discussion.
GROWTH PATTERNS AND PROSPECTS
Keesing's paper shows how little we know about export growth prospects
for industrializing countries. Rather than pursue growth scenarios I shall raise
a number of short points. First I would draw attention to a shifting in trade
pattern. GATT has noted the fact that trade growth between LDCs and DCs
is now proceeding at a higher rate than trade growth among industrialized
countries. At the same time trade among LDCs is growing at very high rates
(as shown in Table 4).
The high growth rates of LDC exports suggest to me two patterns. One
is that developing countries are becoming integrated into intraindustry trade
in consumer and capital goods. The other is that they are swiftly increas-
ing intra-LDC trade, both by trade creation and by trade diversion. There is
little doubt that in an atmosphere of substantial state trading this is the area







GATT, Press Release, 15 February 1980
As Keesing rightly notes, in a regional setting there may well be room for
important scale economies to be achieved. In the same context learning by
doing, which is essential to the quality aspect that Keesing stresses, can be
practiced. The quality aspect is, of course, also an area where an important
increase in public intervention may be entirely appropriate (see on this point
the important paper by G. A. Akerlof, "The Market for Lemons," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 84 (August 1970), pp. 488-500).
In considering Latin-America's export potential we should not limit our-
selves to merchandise trade. One of the quite unanticipated side aspects of the
oil shock has been the large-scale development of international contracting.
Asia, in particular Korea and Pakistan, has taken an important place in this
service trade. In Latin-America countries combining abundant labor and con-
tracting expertise such as Brazil's would naturally be expected to take a place
in this trade.